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BREXIT, Social and Environmental Rights
Through the Looking Glass: Brexit, Free Movement
and the Future
Michael Doherty*
This article looks at some of the implications of Brexit for free movement of persons
within the European Union, for both UK citizens and those from other EU Member
States. It begins by briefly outlining the principle of free movement of persons, one of
the four ‘fundamental freedoms’ set out in the EU Treaties since the Union’s
foundation. The next section looks at the reasons why free movement of persons
became such a fundamental issue in the UK referendum on EU membership,
focusing on the issues of jobs, labour standards and welfare. The article goes on to
consider possible alternatives for the UK’s relationship with the EU, post-Brexit,
in terms of free movement of person rights. In the concluding section, the article
considers the future of free movement of person rights within the EU itself.
I. THE PRINCIPLE
‘Begin at the beginning,’ the King said gravely, ‘and go on till you come to the end: then
stop.’1
The four freedoms, free movement of capital, goods, services and labour, have been seen
as the cornerstones of the European Union since its foundation. The Union’s core aim,
since the Treaty of Rome, has been to ensure that the Member States create a single
trading entity, a ‘common market’, and remove obstacles to free trade. In the context
of current debates on the future of the EU, it is on the core principle of free movement
of workers that most attention has centred; it is this principle that, arguably, had greatest
impact on the decision of the UK electorate to vote to exit the Union.
Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome stated that ‘freedom of movement for workers shall
be secured within the [Union]… Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition
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of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as
regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment’.
This provision (now Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU)) has provided the constitutional basis for the various directives and regu-
lations governing the free movement of persons since 1958. An obvious point to note is
that the provision refers to ‘workers’, ie, economically active persons. However, in
Article 51 (now Article 48 of the TFEU), the Treaty of Rome commits to adopting
such measures in the field of social security as are necessary to provide freedom of move-
ment for workers and their dependants; from the outset, the Treaties recognised the ines-
capable fact that workers, unlike goods and services, may not always travel across
borders unaccompanied. Notwithstanding the establishment of the general principle
in 1958, practical implementation of this free movement right was slow, and it was
only with the passing of Regulation 1612/682 that the details were fleshed out. The Regu-
lation required that Member States established equal rights to social and tax benefits as
between workers moving from another Member State and host State workers; and that
family members of such workers were also allowed to reside and work in the host State.
The ability of family members to move with the worker, and be entitled to equal treat-
ment in the host State, meant that it was not only economically active citizens that would
move, but also, for example, children and elderly relatives; the presence of the latter
groups on the territory of the host State had obvious implications for social services
in the fields of education, healthcare, and so on.
Over the years, Treaty changes, legislative developments and European Court of
Justice case law3 have developed, clarified and, in overview, enlarged the concept of
‘free movement of workers’. This is not the place for a full review of these developments.
Throughout the article, the focus will be primarily on two elements of free movement of
workers, which were pivotal in the Brexit debate: first, the extent to which free move-
ment impacts on labour rights and standards in the host country, and, secondly, the
question of welfare and benefits, and the availability of same to economically active,
and non-active, EU migrants. In the next section, the focus will move to look at these
issues in the specific context of the Brexit debate; first, though, some points of
general principle.
In terms of labour rights and standards, it is important to be clear for what the EU
does, and does not, have competence to legislate. A range of core labour rights, appli-
cable in all the Member States, derives from EU legislation.4 Rights include access to
paid annual holidays, health and safety protection, access to unpaid parental leave,
equal treatment for part-time, fixed-term and agency workers, and consultation
2 Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers
within the Community [1968] OJ L257/2.
3 See Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (OUP, 5th edn 2016) part III.
4 Of course, it is not argued here that such rights would not exist but for EU law (although this did become
an issue in the Brexit referendum campaign, see below), merely that they are mandated by membership of
the EU.
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procedures for worker representatives in the context of corporate restructuring.5 The
TFEU is explicit that the EU does not have competence to legislate in the areas of
pay, or freedom of association and the right to strike (Article 153(5)). Any legislative
proposals in the areas of social security and social protection of workers, protection
of workers on dismissal, and conditions of employment for third-country nationals
legally residing in Union territory are subject to requirements of unanimity, ie, each
Member State retains a veto. As will be seen below, the areas in which the EU has legis-
lated on labour rights featured only to a very marginal extent in the Brexit debate. It was
rather the areas in which there is no EU competence, or where national governments
have a veto, that took centre stage.
In terms of welfare payments and benefits, it is important to highlight EU devel-
opments since the Maastricht Treaty came into force in 1993. This treaty introduced
the status of ‘EU citizenship’; each citizen of a Member State was henceforth also
accorded the status of EU citizen.6 Citizens of the Union have the right to move
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, ‘subject to the limitations
and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them
effect’.7 The significance of Union citizenship became clear when the Court of
Justice found that it could confer on EU citizens the right to reside in a host
Member State irrespective of the economic status of the person.8 This idea reached
its high (or low, depending on one’s perspective) water mark in Grzelczyk, where
the Court declared that ‘Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status
of nationals of the Member States’.9 However, both the Court and the Treaties are
clear that citizenship rights may be subject to limitations. In essence, the rights of
EU migrant citizens, for the purposes of this article, are, predominantly, subject to
the detailed rules laid down in the Citizens’ Rights Directive and the Regulation on
the coordination of social security systems.10 Again, this is not the place for a detailed
analysis of the provisions of the legislation. It will suffice to say that the rights granted
and acquired under them are heavily qualified by the economic status of the EU
migrant; workers get the most rights, and non-economically active citizens the
fewest. Furthermore, to access rights, most non-economically active migrants must
show some relationship of dependence on a worker.
5 See the TUC report, ‘UK Employment Rights and the EU’ (2016) <www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/UK
%20employment%20rights%20and%20the%20EU.pdf> accessed 30 September 2016.
6 TFEU, Art 20.
7 TFEU, Art 21.
8 Case C–413/99 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I–7091.
9 Case C–184/99 Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR I–6193,
para 31; see Eleanor Spaventa, ‘Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union Citizenship
and Its Constitutional Effects’ (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 13.
10 Directive No 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the
Member States [2004] OJ L158/77; Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L166/1.
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Having sketched the outline of what free movement of persons involves under EU
law, the next section will examine the main difficulties with the concept that featured in
advance of the vote of 23 June.
II. THE PROBLEM
‘When I use a word,’Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I
choose it to mean—neither more nor less.’11
The purpose of the article is not to rehearse the various arguments put forward during
the referendum. Instead, this section will analyse some of the key issues relating to the
two core areas of focus, labour standards and welfare rights, in the context of looking to
the future of free movement rights in the UK and EU.
Two aspects of the ‘renegotiation package’ agreed by the UK and the European
Council in advance of the referendum related directly to labour standards.12 The first
was that there would be increased emphasis on reducing unwarranted regulatory
burdens on employers (cutting ‘red tape’); as Craig puts it ‘competitiveness should be
written into the “DNA” of the EU’.13 Implicitly, ‘regulatory burden’ referred, at least
in part, to employment law. Secondly, the package referred directly to free movement
and immigration; in particular, that a ‘safeguard mechanism’ would be put in place
for Member States responding to situations of inflow of workers from other Member
States of an ‘exceptional magnitude’ over an extended period of time. This would auth-
orise such Member States to limit the access of newly arriving EU workers to non-con-
tributory in-work benefits for a total period of up to four years from the
commencement of employment, and would have a limited duration, applying to EU
workers newly arriving during a period of seven years. In essence, then, one measure
sought greater room to manoeuvre in reducing the burden on industry of employment
protections,14 while the other sought to reduce the ‘pull’ factors felt to be enticing other
EU citizens to the UK, and, therefore, to reduce the number of EU citizens seeking to
enter the UK.
On both aspects, available data seemed to question the extent to which there was a
problem at all, or how acute it might be. The UK’s labour market is already one of the
11 Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass (1871; Public Domain Books 2006), p. 99.
12 <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2016/02/18-19/> accessed 30 September
2016.
13 Paul P Craig, ‘Brexit: A Drama in Six Acts’ (2016) European Law Review (forthcoming).
14 In the line of fire, in particular, was the Working Time Directive (Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23
November 1993 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time [1993] OJ L307/18). In
his Bloomberg speech of 2013, former Prime Minister David Cameron stated that ‘it is neither right
nor necessary to claim that the integrity of the single market, or full membership of the European
Union, requires the working hours of British hospital doctors to be set in Brussels irrespective of the
views of British parliamentarians and practitioners’ <www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-
bloomberg> accessed 30 September 2016.
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most flexible, and lightly regulated, in the world.15 Indeed, to refer back to the issue of
areas of competence, the UK has only recently reduced the level of unfair dismissal pro-
tection, by increasing the qualifying period of employment necessary to take a claim
from one year to two,16 and has seen a dramatic decrease in the number of claims
being brought to employment tribunals, as a result of the introduction of a regime of
fees;17 the regulatory burden had been reducing fast even within the EU. On the
‘numbers issue’, there certainly has been an increase in the numbers of EU citizens
moving to the UK in recent years. The Office for National Statistics (ONS) Labour
Force Survey estimates for 2015 showed that there were 3.3 million EU citizens in the
UK; 1.6 million from the EU14, 1.3 million from the EU8, 300,000 from Romania
and Bulgaria, and the remainder from the other EU countries of Malta, Cyprus and
Croatia.18 Although this represents only 5 per cent of the UK population, and the
number of non-EU migrants living in the UK is higher, the decision of the UK govern-
ment in 2004 not to apply restrictions on the entry of migrants from the ‘new’Member
States, and the increase in migration from Southern European Member States, where the
impact of the crisis since 2008 has been particularly felt, has resulted in increases in net
migration to the UK.19 The question of the economic costs and benefits of such
migration, of course, became a key issue in the referendum debate.
Jobs and Working Conditions
As mentioned above, the implications of ‘cutting red tape’ for employment rights pro-
tection in the UK did not seem to get a huge amount of traction in the campaign. This
reflects, perhaps, the rather less than positive, and less than energetic, support for
Remain amongst many on the left, whose main message appeared to be: ‘the EU isn’t
great, but things could be worse outside, under a Tory government’.20 As previously
noted, the issue was clearly highlighted by the Trades Union Congress. However, on a
15 To take one measure by way of example, on the OECD ‘Strictness of employment protection—individual
and collective dismissals’, the UK is placed third of OECD countries <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?
DataSetCode=EPL_OV> accessed 30 September 2016.
16 The Unfair Dismissal and Statement of Reasons for Dismissal (Variation of Qualifying Period) Order
2012, SI 2012/989.
17 <www.acas.org.uk/index.aspx?articleid=1889> accessed 30 September 2016.
18 Approximately 1.2 million UK citizens live elsewhere in the EU <www.ons.gov.uk/
employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/bulletins/uklabourmarket/
february2016> accessed 30 September 2016.
19 ‘What do we know about EU migration to the UK?’ (Oxford Migration Observatory) <www.
migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/commentaries/what-do-we-know-about-eu-migration-to-the-
uk/> accessed 30 September 2016.
20 This is, of course, a rather simplistic generalisation; forensic analyses of the difficult issue of which way
those committed to strengthening, rather than weakening, labour protections should vote were readily
available; see, for example, John Hendy, ‘Workers’ and Trade Union Rights: The Dilemma of the EU
Referendum’ <www.ier.org.uk/sites/ier.org.uk/files/11%20John%20Hendy%20papers.pdf> accessed 30
September 2016.
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fundamental level, the union movement found itself in a quandary. Whilst acknowled-
ging that EU membership had resulted in the securing of important employment rights,
unions across the EU have been highly critical of recent developments in the realm of
social policy in the EU. The Court of Justice, in a series of judgments known as the
‘Laval Quartet’ has ‘subjugated the fundamental human rights to strike and bargain
collectively to the freedoms of business enshrined in the Four Pillars of the EU
Treaty’.21 At the same time, the EU institutions have imposed severe austerity measures
on countries such as Greece, Portugal and Ireland, which have included requirements to
dramatically decrease the role of collective bargaining.22 As the EU has been seen by the
labour movement to take an increasingly neo-liberal turn, it was difficult then to
robustly defend it as a guarantor of workers’ rights.
The debate around whether or not EU migrants were ‘taking’ jobs from, and thus
increasing unemployment amongst, UK citizens, and/or depressing labour standards,
is a complex one (although one might not always have realised this from the tenor of
the referendum debate). Again, some of the data seemed to cast doubt on such
claims. The UK’s unemployment rate remained relatively low in the 2008–15 period,
peaking at just over 8 per cent in 2011, before falling back to just over 5 per cent by
2015. However, ironically in the case of the ‘welfare debate’ below, the employment
rate in 2015 amongst EU12 citizens (including here Cyprus and Malta) was higher
than the rate amongst UK citizens.23 The extent to which migrant workers depress
wages and/or living standards is notoriously difficult to measure from an economic
perspective.24
Perhaps, then, it is better to focus less on the veracity of the various claims and more
on the role they played in the referendum outcome. First, individual, unemployed UK
citizens encountering Polish taxi-drivers or Romanian sales assistants are unlikely to
be impressed by what macro-economic data suggest, especially in the context of auster-
ity. Secondly, it is clear that migration is not spread evenly across the UK; what macro-
figures do not show are strains in terms of unemployment, low wages and pressure on
social services in specific local areas. Third, and similarly, the impact of migration in
terms of employment rates and working conditions has a sectoral dimension; it is
21 Hendy (n 20) 3. The ‘Laval Quartet’ refers to Case C–341/05 Laval v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet
[2007] ECR I–11767; Case C–438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s
Union v Viking Line ABP [2007] ECR I–10779; Case C–346/06 Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen [2008]
ECR I–1989; and Case C–319/06 Commission v Luxembourg [2006] ECR 1–8673.
22 Eftychia Achtsioglou and Michael Doherty, ‘There Must Be Some Way Out of Here… The Crisis, Labour
Rights and Member States in the Eye of the Storm’ (2014) 20 European Law Journal 219.
23 Eurofound, ‘Workers’ Mobility and Migration: How to Achieve a Balance in Europe?’ Foundation Focus
(December 2015) <www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/foundation-focus/2015/labour-market-social-
policies/foundation-focus-workers-in-europe-mobility-and-migration> accessed 30 September 2016.
24 See Stephen Nickell and Jumana Saleheen, ‘The Impact of Immigration on Occupational Wages: Evidence
from Britain’ (2015) ‘Channel 4 FactCheck: does immigration drive down wages?’ the Bank of England
report that led to yet another media spat between the Leave and Remain camps <http://blogs.channel4.
com/factcheck/factcheck-boris-johnson-alex-salmond-does-eu-immigration-drive-down-wages/23102>
accessed 30 September 2016.
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clear that in sectors like construction the impact of intra-EU migration, including the
separate but related question of the posting of workers temporarily to the UK to work
on construction sites, was more significant than in other sectors.25 Finally, it should
be noted that the issue of ‘precarious work’ was a significant one in the run-up to the
UK general election of 2015, particularly the issues of ‘zero hours’ contracts and low
pay.26 Such contracts are used widely in construction and agriculture, but have
become increasingly associated with service sector employment (notably in accommo-
dation, food services and retail),27 all sectors with significant numbers of migrant
workers.
The key question is, in all of these areas, will Brexit fix the problem? To answer this,
one might assess which problems stem from membership of the EU and which do not.
To begin with, as a non-Eurozone country, austerity measures in the UK have been
mostly imposed on a fully autonomous basis by the UK government itself.28 In terms of
geographical and sectoral concentration of migrants, it must be emphasised that the
issue is not simply one of labour supply. As Dominic Casciani has pointed out:
The key factor in all the changes is the economy. The UK has been growing faster than
many parts of the Eurozone. British employers have become savvy at how to get cheap
foreign workers—with employment agencies working hard on the continent to identify
and sign up foreign labour.29
An exclusive focus on the ‘flood’ of cheap labour supply misses the point that UK leg-
islative and policy choices, and employer preferences, have created the conditions
where demand for cheap labour has flourished; in this respect, the prevalence of pre-
carious contracts, the diminution of trade union rights and the withdrawal of insti-
tutional support for sectoral collective bargaining, and the inadequate resourcing of
labour inspectorates are all issues that must be laid at the national, rather than Euro-
pean, door.
However, as will be argued in the concluding section, it would be a mistake to
overly particularise the UK position. At a fundamental level, the antipathy, and hosti-
lity, towards the EU demonstrated by a large section of the UK electorate, might be
seen as symptomatic of a much wider issue. Globalisation, Milanovic argues, has
25 See, for example, Catherine Barnard, ‘“British Jobs for BritishWorkers”: The Lindsey Oil Refinery Dispute
and the Future of Local Labour Clauses in an Integrated EU Market’ (2009) 38 Industrial Law Journal 245.
26 ‘Zero-hours Contracts: A 2015 General Election Hot Topic’ <http://realbusiness.co.uk/hr-and-
management/2015/02/26/zero-hours-contracts-a-2015-general-election-hot-topic/> accessed 30 Septem-
ber 2016.
27 Office for National Statistics, <www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/earningsand
workinghours/articles/contractsthatdonotguaranteeaminimumnumberofhours/september2016> accessed 30
September 2016.
28 <www.gov.uk/government/policies/deficit-reduction> accessed 30 September 2016.
29 <www.bbc.com/news/uk-31748423> accessed 30 September 2016. The article reports on research carried
out by the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, which put together a suite of information
about migrant numbers at the local level: <www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/reports/
projected-number-foreign-born-residents-local-areas-2014/> accessed 30 September 2016.
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generated winners and losers and, firmly in the latter camp, are the lower and middle
classes of the wealthiest countries (like the UK).30 Without some regulatory interven-
tion and compensatory measures (see concluding section), it is not hard to envisage
why these groups would feel threatened by competition on the jobs (and housing,
etc) markets from mainly young, skilled and low-wage migrants from the East. Free
movement—of goods, services, capital and labour—has been robustly promoted by
the EU institutions, with the right to provide cross-border services proclaimed by
the Court of Justice in Laval as a freedom so fundamental it must trump fundamental
social rights, like freedom of association. However, the Union, whilst opening up
markets and promoting free trade, has left social policy (including wage and tax
policy) largely in the hands of national governments (except where social rights
must cede to the demands of the internal market), which, in terms of Eurozone
members, are in turn severely constrained by the fiscal rules imposed since the 2008
crisis began.31 Moreover, as Pogátsa argues:
This has allowed eastern European governments to pursue a variant of capitalism that is
based on pursuing the advantages of low wages, limited trade union rights, and no more
than rudimentary welfare… The same model that has relocated low wage jobs from west
to east is also pushing easterners to the west in search of real opportunities.32
For those left behind in the EU after Brexit, a new balance between market rules and
social solidarity measures will have to be struck, that is sensitive to, not only national,
but regional and localised concerns about intra-EU migration.
On the more specific issues of the difficulties caused by posting of workers, and
the related issue of cross-border agency work, the report card is mixed. The new
enforcement directive for posted workers has now been transposed in most
Member States,33 and the Juncker Commission has given some indications that a
revision of the parent posting directive itself is being contemplated.34 The Temporary
Agency Work Directive has provided important protections for agency workers, but
30 Branko Milanovic, Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization (Harvard University
Press 2016).
31 See Michael Doherty, ‘Back to the Future of EU Labour Law? A Review of Marc Rigaux, Jan Buelens and
Amanda Latinne, From Labour Law to Social Competition Law?’ (2014) 25 King’s Law Journal 467.
32 Zoltán Pogátsa, ‘The Solution to Brexit Lies in Eastern Europe’ <www.socialeurope.eu/2016/07/solution-
brexit-lies-eastern-europe/> accessed 30 September 2016.
33 Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the enforcement
of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services and
amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through the Internal Market
Information System (‘the IMI Regulation’) [2014] OJ L159/11. It should, of course, be noted that the
UK government, prior to 1996, sought to resist attempts to adopt the posted workers directive at all,
expressing concern that such a measure would restrict the operation of a free European labour market;
Tonia Novitz, ‘UK Implementation of the Posting of Workers Directive 96/71/EC’ in Stein Evju (ed),
Cross-Border Services, Posting of Workers, and Multilevel Governance (University of Oslo 2013).
34 ‘The Commission presents reform of posting of workers – towards a fair and truly European Labour Market’
<http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&newsId=2488&furtherNews=yes> accessed 30
September 2016.
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may not be sufficient, in itself, to protect against cross-border exploitation of such
workers.35 Of course, post-Brexit, the UK government will be in a position to
repeal all of this legislation.
Welfare Tourists?
Perhaps the most dispiriting aspect of the Brexit referendum (to this author, at least) was
the debate around restricting welfare and benefits. In the ‘renegotiation package’, it was
made clear that, under the Treaties, Member States retain the right to define the funda-
mental principles of their social security systems, and may impose conditions in relation
to certain benefits to ensure that there is a real and effective degree of connection
between the person concerned and the State’s labour market.36
The deal for the UK essentially focused on the availability of in-work benefits (dis-
cussed above) and the exportation of child benefits to a Member State other than the
UK. In the ensuing debate, however, much of the rhetoric focused on ‘benefit
tourism’ more generally. Statistical evidence produced was largely ignored; by way of
example, one can look at the study by the UCL Centre for Research and Analysis of
Migration (CReAM), which showed that European immigrants to the UK paid more
in taxes than they received in benefits, and that migrants arriving since 2000 were 43
per cent less likely than natives to receive state benefits or tax credits, and 7 per cent
less likely to live in social housing.37
Nonetheless, the issue clearly resonated with a section of the electorate, probably for
similar reasons to those outlined in the previous section. It is interesting that recent case
law of the Court of Justice has, in fact, been highly criticised by some for effectively start-
ing to chip away at the equal treatment principle in the areas of social security and social
assistance, in cases like Dano38 and Brey.39 Following Brexit, the UK will be able to
arrange its welfare system as it pleases, in terms of non-UK citizens (leaving aside, for
the moment, the question of ‘acquired rights’). The concessions offered to the UK,
however, are likely to be viewed with interest by other Member States, leading to a poss-
ible further erosion of the equal treatment principle.
35 Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on tempor-
ary agency work [2008] OJ L327/9. See Chris Forde and Gary Slater, ‘Labour Market Regulation and the
“Competition State”: An Analysis of the Implementation of the Agency Working Regulations in the UK’
(2016) 30 Work, Employment and Society 590.
36 <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2016/02/18-19/> accessed 30 September
2016.
37 <www.ucl.ac.uk/news/news-articles/1114/051114-economic-impact-EU-immigration> accessed 30 Sep-
tember 2016; Christian Dustmann and Tommaso Frattini, ‘The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the
UK’ (2014) 124 Economic Journal F593.
38 Case C–333/13 Dano ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358.
39 Case C–140/12 Brey ECLI:EU:C:2013:565. See Dagmar Schiek and others, EU Social and Labour Rights and
EU Internal Market Law (2015) 59 <www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/563457/IPOL_
STU(2015)563457_EN.pdf> accessed 30 September 2016.
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III. THE ALTERNATIVES
‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different
things.’40
To paraphrase a former US Secretary of Defense, we are now at a point where there are
very few ‘known knowns’ indeed. The UK Prime Minister has indicated that formal
negotiations on the UK’s exit from the Union will commence in spring 2017. The
options for the UK’s future relationship with the EU seem to amount to the ‘Norway
model’, the ‘Swiss model’ or the ‘WTO model’. In terms of free movement of
persons, a brief outline of each is as follows:41
. Norway:42 the UK remains a member of the European Economic Area (EEA). This
would seem unlikely to satisfy the Leave voters, as the UK would be required to
accept free movement of persons. Should this option prevail, free movement law
will continue to apply to the UK.
. Switzerland:43 relations between the UK and the EU would be governed by bilateral
treaties on a case-by-case basis. Thus, the issue of free movement of persons could
be the subject of specific treaty negotiations and agreements. However, to think free
movement of persons could simply be ‘hived off’ into a separate arrangement, if
agreement could be reached at all, would be naïve. This option will be considered
further in the closing section.
. World Trade Organization (WTO):44 This is the ‘cleanest break’ option, in that EU
free movement of person rules would cease to apply. Some system of work permits/
visas would be put in place for non-UK citizens; of course, other states (and the EU)
would put in place reciprocal (or retaliatory…) measures. It would be tricky, in this
instance, to maintain free movement of services, as this is intimately linked with free
movement of persons. Furthermore, UK citizens in other EU countries would
become third-country nationals.
At this point, we simply do not know what the ultimate outcome of negotiations will be.
For those UK citizens living in another EU State, or other EU citizens living in the UK,
40 Lewis Carroll (Charles L Dodgson), Through the Looking-Glass (1934) chapter 6, 205.
41 For a full account, see Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti, European Union Law (CUP,
3rd edn 2014); a new chapter 5A, ‘The Authority of EU Law beyond the Union’ is now available.
42 ‘Lord Nelson! Lord Beaverbrook! Sir Winston Churchill! Sir Anthony Eden! Clement Attlee! Henry
Cooper! Lady Diana! Maggie Thatcher—can you hear me, Maggie Thatcher! Your boys took one hell
of a beating! Your boys took one hell of a beating!’ (Bjorge Lillelien on Norwegian TV, as Norway beat
England 2-1 in Oslo in a World Cup qualifier in September 1981).
43 ‘The Swiss option, EFTAmembership plus a host of bilateral treaties, is the best starting place and is informa-
tive inmanyways. It is not perfect for us however. It incorporates “freemovement of people” for themoment
… the optimum aim for us would be similar, but without the free movement of peoples’ (David Davis, UK
Minister for Exiting the EU, speech on Brexit at the Institute of Chartered Engineers, February 4, 2016 http://
www.daviddavismp.com/daviddavis-speech-on-brexit-at-the-institute-of-chartered-engineers/).
44 ‘June 23rd will go down in history as our Independence Day’ (Nigel Farage, former leader of UKIP, https://
www.rt.com/news/348129-farage-brexit-independence-day/).
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the question of what, if any, rights will be ‘acquired’ is a key one. Douglas-Scott has
argued that neither EU law nor international law guarantees clear protection of acquired
rights, absent a suitable withdrawal agreement focused on them.45 Many EU citizens will
have gained a right of residence in the UK by 2019; UK citizens abroad may well be
entitled to rely on principles of legal certainty in terms of their residence rights.
However, ultimately, this is, unfortunately, likely to be a key political question to be
resolved in the withdrawal negotiations.
IV. THE FUTURE
‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master—that’s all.’46
For those who voted Leave on the basis of some of the issues explored in section 2, Brexit
will not be a magic wand, sweeping away discontent. For the EU, Brexit will not allow a
return to ‘business as usual’ following the departure of the ‘problem child’. There are
wider issues at play here.
It was argued above that a new balance between market freedoms and social protec-
tion will have to be struck; this applies in the EU, but also in a post-Brexit UK. In short,
the ‘losers of globalisation’ will have to be better protected and compensated. This will
require, at a fundamental level, a rethinking of fiscal rules supporting austerity policies, a
change in the direction of ‘structural reforms’, which seek to make labour markets ever
more ‘flexible’, whilst reducing social security protection, and, at EU level, a rethinking
of the primacy accorded market freedoms over social rights. An interesting thought; if a
large issue behind Brexit was the pressure immigrants put on social services, why were
there so many voices calling for fewer immigrants and so few calling for more social ser-
vices? Simply put, protecting those losing out from free movement will require national,
and supra-national, state expenditure.47
The gap between macro-data and local experience has been highlighted above. In the
UK, not insignificant sections of the electorate who voted Leave were based in local areas
that have been devastated by de-industrialisation.48 If the EU wishes to promote
maximum mobility of citizens, then the EU must play a role in mitigating negative loca-
lised effects. This could involve some sort of ‘migration fund’, where the money follows
the EU migrants, and aid is available to Member States or regions disproportionately
affected by intra-EU migration. Similarly, EU-wide levies on capital to finance a larger
‘training fund’ for workers ‘displaced’ by migration flows could be countenanced (a
‘beefed-up’ version of the ‘globalisation fund’). Lastly, concrete measures to achieve
45 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, ‘What Happens to “Acquired Rights” in the Event of a Brexit?’ (UK Constitutional
Law Blog, 16 May 2016) <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/> accessed 30 September 2016.
46 Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass (1871; Public Domain Books 2006), p. 99.
47 Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox (Oxford University Press 2012).
48 Of course, the extent to which the ‘blame’ for this can be laid at the EU’s door, given UK industrial policy
since the 1980s is extremely debateable, but a debate for another day…
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the ‘access to adequate minimum income’ trumpeted by the Commission’s ‘European
Pillar of Social Rights’ strategy would be welcome.49
In conclusion, let’s return to the ‘Swiss model’. It was noted during the UK referen-
dum campaign that, while Swiss voters had accepted the free movement of Romanian
and Bulgarian workers in 2009, in 2014 a plebiscite passed, which centred on immigra-
tion quotas for foreigners, including EU citizens. Erne and Imboden argue that what
made the difference in the earlier referendum was agreement amongst trade unions,
employer organisations and government to implement ‘flanking measures’ in order to
boost popular support for the opening of the Swiss labour market to European
migrant workers.50 These measures ensured that workers posted to Switzerland were
subject to local wage and employment conditions, facilitated the legal extension of col-
lective agreements to all employers and employees operating in a given sector, and set up
tripartite commissions, with extensive law enforcement powers to enforce the principle
of equal wages for workers of different origins. In other words, the measures were all
aimed at preventing the abusive undercutting of local wage and employment conditions,
particularly in low-wage sectors: ie, aimed at reducing the demand for cheap labour. By
2014, however, the changing mood, Erne argues, can be significantly explained by the
‘limited sectorial scope of the flanking measures and a gradual erosion of the class-com-
promise that hitherto had been sustaining them’.51 The Swiss have not yet legislated for
the plebiscite. At the time of writing this seems imminent. However, look away now
Brexiteers, it will be achieved following agreement with the European Union… 52
In conclusion, the answer, then, to both UK and EU concerns about cross-border
mobility seems to lie in a combination of state support for those that lose out, and regu-
latory intervention to prevent exploitation of those that move. A recognition of this may
yet mean, to quote Churchill, that this is not the end, or not even the beginning of the
end, but is, perhaps, just ‘the end of the beginning’.
49 Towards a European Pillar of Social Rights <http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/publications/towards-european-
pillar-social-rights-policy-domains_en> accessed 30 September 2016.
50 Roland Erne and Natalie Imboden, ‘Equal Pay by Gender and by Nationality: A Comparative Analysis of
Switzerland’s Unequal Equal Pay Policy Regimes across Time’ (2015) 39 Cambridge Journal of Economics
655.
51 Roland Erne, ‘How To Explain The Swiss Vote Against The Free Movement Of Workers’ <www.
socialeurope.eu/2014/03/explain-swiss-vote-free-movement-workers-european-union/> accessed 30 Sep-
tember 2016.
52 Bloomberg, ‘Top Swiss Diplomat Says EU May Accept ‘Light’ Immigration Plan’ <www.swissinfo.ch/eng/
top-swiss-diplomat-says-eu-may-accept–light–immigration-plan/42485236> accessed 30 September 2016.
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